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Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has, from the beginning of his tenure, made public declarations of his 
deep engagement with cooperation in the region, and outlined very ambitious visions about its future. 
The idea to make 2013, the year of Hungary’s presidencies of the Visegrad Group and the Central 
European Initiative, a Central European year, is a part of the policy of special attachment to regional 
matters too. However, there is a visible gap between politicians’ rhetoric and their activity. This is 
especially true regarding Hungary’s dialogue with Romania and Slovakia, which, due to many historical, 
social and psychological obstacles, has always been most challenging for leaders in Budapest. Orbán’s 
government, though, by taking steps to culturally and politically unify Hungarians from the Carpathian 
Basin, promoting historically ambiguous persons and inviting revisionists such as Erika Steinbach to 
parliament, not only fails to engender a good atmosphere in the region, but also proves how lively 
among the country’s governing elite are both resentments from the past and temptations to use them 
to achieve temporary political goals. 
A Great Vision: Central Europe as the New Heart of the Continent?  
When, almost 80 years ago, Polish journalist Konrad Wrzos asked Hungary’s head of state regent Miklós 
Horthy, what the country’s policy in the region was, the response was: “Our geographic position is of the 
kind that, without us, nothing in the Carpathian Basin, neither from the political nor economic point of 
view, can be done.”2 Today, although the geopolitical situation of both Hungary and the region have 
improved unequivocally, the current leadership of the country could actually say the same. But in his 
speeches and interviews, Viktor Orbán has not only emphasised the need for Hungary’s involvement in 
Central European (CE) matters, but has also shaped quite courageous visions about the region’s future. At 
the 2011 European Economic Congress in Katowice, he noted that CE would, in 20 years, be the most 
                                                          
 
1 This analysis was prepared in Budapest and supported by the Balassi Institute programme. Basic sources of information were 
personal interviews with decision-makers, diplomats, experts and journalists from all below-mentioned countries, Hungarian and 
international media, and statistical data. 
2 K. Wrzos, Wulkany Europy: Austria – Węgry – Bałkany, Towarzystwo Wydawnicze Rój, Warszawa, 1936, p. 65. 
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competitive part of Europe.3 Why is this so? The concept of a “beautiful future for CE” is based on at least 
three pillars.  
Firstly, like George Friedman, author of the futuristic essay 
“The Next 100 Years,” Orbán seems to believe that the rise 
of the region will be a simple consequence of both the 
collapse of the existing centres of global political and 
economic life and the corrosion of the system of 
international institutions.. He has stressed regularly that the 
gradual decline of the West can be seen as a result of 
unlimited consumption, lack of respect for work, and 
willingness to incur debts, the “sins” that Hungary under his 
premiership have successfully avoided. However, it is not 
only the economic crisis, but also a shift from Europe’s 
historical and spiritual heritage, that reportedly contributes 
to changes in global geopolitics.  
Secondly, according to Orbán, the vision of a strong CE is justified by its own economic potential. A few 
months ago, during a lecture at the University of Helsinki, he noted optimistically that, according to 
experts, CE could become the growth engine of the continent, and that if CE countries had been able to 
become members of the EU at the beginning of the 1990s, the union would have been in a much stronger 
position to face the challenges of the crisis. It is interesting that, in his view, this jump is not necessarily 
connected to recent economic measures taken by individual governments, but rather to general and more 
historically-rooted “skills and attitudes” of Central Europeans and their natural work productivity.  
And thirdly, there is among the Hungarian political elite a steady belief that CE will be able to establish  
a kind of “special partnership” with non-European countries from the East, which, while searching for an 
opportunity to invest in the EU, will choose the region as their gateway. The Orbán government has made 
enhanced Asian ties a cornerstone of its foreign policy and its diplomatic efforts have concentrated 
increasingly on reinforcing the country’s contacts with a large part of the continent, from Northeast Asia 
through Central Asia and Transcaucasia, to the Persian Gulf. The main aim was, however, to attract China. 
Significantly, while welcoming the Chinese prime minister in Budapest in June 2011, Orbán praised not only 
his country, but the economic abilities of the whole region from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic, comprising 
more than 100 million people.  
Indeed, the vision itself seems to be both attractive and comprehensive. However, Orbán focuses mostly 
on the economic and geopolitical capacity of CE, but one should expect that Hungary, striving under his 
leadership to become “a strong driver in the region,” would also become an example of a responsible 
dialogue creator on bilateral matters. There are specific countries, such as the Czech Republic and Poland, 
with whom contacts have been always cordial, and they remain so under Orbán. But, when it comes to the 
more complicated relationships with states where the question of a Hungarian minority or historical 
resentments are still active, the current government in Budapest is not always able to separate its strategic 
from temporary political goals. A mixture of tactical mistakes, the dominance of ideology over pragmatism, 
the need to maintain tensions for domestic purposes, and the domination of the national “hawks” rather 
than “doves” in Orbán’s closest circle (See Annex 3) contribute to the fact that Hungary sometimes heats 
the atmosphere in the region, rather than laying the foundations for compromise.  
Viktor vs Victor: Tug of War with Romania 
Looking at the relationship with Romania, one could easily detect the general attitude of Orbán’s Hungary 
towards neighbouring states. Using his own strong position in the country, but also drawing on the lessons 
of a socialist government for which the failure to maintain good relations with Slovakia in 2007–2010 was 
due largely to emotional and personal misunderstandings, Budapest directed its efforts to build ties based 
                                                          
 
3 Speeches and interviews are available in Hungarian and English at www.miniszterelnok.hu and www.kormány.hu. 
 
Central Europe is awaiting a beautiful future. 
If all needed reforms are carried out, in the 
coming years a broad and strong space of 
development will be established, here, 
between the Baltic and the Adriatic. 
Viktor Orbán, 7 May 2012, Zagreb 
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on good individual contacts between the leaders. In Romania, this “personal diplomacy” was all the more 
justified by a long-term friendship between Orbán and a powerful centre-right president Traian Băsescu, 
and the fact that these leaders’ parties, Fidesz in Hungary and the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) in 
Romania, belonged to the same group in the European Parliament. That is why Fidesz politicians did not 
hesitate to back Băsescu, even in his domestic disputes, engaging themselves in the issue to such an extent 
that, during the 2012 presidential dismissal referendum, they urged Hungarians living in Romania not to 
vote.  
An inevitable success of “personal diplomacy” was to relieve tensions between the countries and improve 
atmosphere, which in the past was hardly as good as at that time. The main focus was on common strategic 
initiatives concerning energy security, such as the Romanian–Hungarian gas interconnector and joint efforts 
to push the AGRI project (gas transport from Azerbaijan via Georgia and the Black Sea to Romania and 
Hungary). Politicians concentrated also on cooperation at EU level, since both Hungary and Romania had 
similar positions on the enlargement of the Schengen Area, the implementation of the European Union 
Strategy for the Danube Region, and negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020. It is 
therefore not surprising that temptation to formalise the relationship emerged: it was Orbán’s idea to set 
up a kind of Hungarian–Polish–Romanian alliance, which he discussed during his very first foreign visit, to 
Warsaw, in June 2010. Polish diplomats gave this concept a rather cold welcome, afraid not only that such 
an alliance could become an unwanted alternative to the Visegrad Group, but also that the Hungarian–
Romanian friendship was in fact built on too weak foundations. And they were right.  
It soon became clear that Budapest had made a mistake, not only in basing the country’s strategy almost 
purely on contacts with Băsescu and his political environment, but also in publically reprimanding the 
Romanian opposition to the president. When the latter unexpectedly came to power in May 2012, Hungary 
was automatically drawn into domestic competition between Băsescu and Victor Ponta, the new prime 
minister at the head of the broad socialist-national-liberal coalition. A stormy dispute between them 
included the issue of relations with their western neighbour, and above all the position of the strong 
Hungarian minority (around 1.2 million, 6.5% of Romania’s population), which once again became a hot 
political issue.4 When power was in the hands of the conservatives and their coalition partner, the 
Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), Romania’s policy did indeed lean towards 
compromise; Bucharest not only accepted that the Hungarian minority in Romania could be granted 
Hungarian citizenship, but also did not oppose the organisation of Fidesz annual meetings in the Romanian 
city of Băile Tușnad, where the party’s leaders gave speeches which could, by some, be perceived as 
provocative.5   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
4 The most spectacular clash between Hungary and Romania on minorities—the so-called “the war of the flag”—took place in 
February 2013. The Székelys, an autochthonous Hungarian-speaking minority, which in the two districts of Transylvania accounts 
for 80% of the local population and fights for its autonomy, displayed a Székelys flag at the Budafok city hall in Covasna. The 
Romanian side argued that this was illegal, since the Hungarian flag, not the Székelys flag, was registered as the official symbol of the 
minority. This was firmly rebuffed by Zsolt Németh, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and by the Hungarian 
ambassador in Bucharest, Oszkár Füzes. The latter was in return threatened with expulsion from the country by the Romanian 
government.  
5 Since 1990, Fidesz has been organising the summer course called Bálványos Free University in Băile Tușnad, a small town in the 
Romanian Harghita County, where 94% of the population are Székelys. Recently, during meetings with local Hungarians, politicians 
of the ruling party have been giving talks about Hungary’s national policy. For example, the 2010 session was held under the slogan 
of “the unification and strengthening of the Hungarian nation across borders.” The Romanian left-wing opposition often accused 
Fidesz of using these sessions for spreading nationalism and racism. 
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Hungarians in Romania, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Wikipedia, based on the national census in Romania from 2011. 
 
After the change of government in Bucharest, the Hungarian–Romanian conflict reignited spectacularly. 
According to Budapest, Ponta decided to modify the former strategy towards minorities, either by directly 
targeting their rights or by pushing for domestic transformations that could be detrimental to them. It is 
true that the exchange of accusations with Hungary offered an opportunity to distract attention from the 
domestic political crisis in Romania, but Budapest was not interested in extinguishing the conflict either. For 
Hungarian politicians, such a resolution would require the withdrawal from the previous policy of dividing 
the Romanian political scene into good and bad sheriffs.6 They had no intention of doing so, and that is why 
they started to heat the atmosphere in order to use the dispute to achieve temporary political goals in 
their country, just as Ponta was doing. And the more Ponta tried to distinguish himself from Băsescu’s 
policy, the more the Hungarian government supported autonomist tendencies among the Székelys 
autochthonous Hungarian-speaking minority (around 49% of Hungarians in Romania), quite unrealistically 
believing that parliament, unstable as it was, but still dominated by the social-national-liberals, would agree 
on that during the current tenure.  
It is thus hard to escape the impression that the current erosion of the Hungarian–Romanian partnership is 
rather about the individual ambitions of politicians (from both sides), and that minority rights are used as an 
instrument rather than the main goal. After all, the Romanian case showed how risky and treacherous the 
concept of “personal diplomacy” may be, for its success is equally dependent on the leader’s strength, 
contacts and sensitivity, and on the domestic situation in the foreign country. It can always take an 
unexpected turn, and those whom one once defined explicitly as enemies may someday become partners in 
dialogue. The last three years of the Hungary–Romania relationship could be compared to a pendulum or, 
more precisely, a tug of war competition: Orbán’s “personal diplomacy” bore fruit only as long as Băsescu 
had the final say in the country’s decision-making. However, when Ponta appeared, Budapest’s involvement 
was used against him and the relations between the two became much worse than they would have been if 
Hungarian leaders had kept at more of a distance from domestic developments in Romania.  
 
                                                          
 
6 Orbán expressed it more ambiguously: “patriots” vs “internationalists,” speech of 28 July 2012, Băile Tușnad. 
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The Calm before the Storm? A Two-Track Policy towards Slovakia  
Compared to the quite turbulent cooperation with Romania, Hungary’s current relationship with its 
northern neighbour, Slovakia, appears at first glance to be much easier. Here, the method of “personal 
diplomacy” has been implemented too. It runs unexpectedly smoothly, given that single parties with 
overwhelming parliamentary majorities are in power in both countries (Fidesz in Hungary and the left-wing 
SMER-Social Democracy, since April 2012, in Slovakia), and that these parties are headed by ideologically 
opposite leaders who each have a tendency towards populist gestures regarding nationhood. 
Orbán and Robert Fico have met at least six times at a bilateral level during the past year, including the 
joint opening of the new bridge in the border city of Komárom, watching football games together in 
Bratislava, and sharing ideas for tackling the crisis, at the Hungarian–Slovak Economic Forum, during which 
Orbán generously praised “a talented and successful neighbour” for a good economic performance. The 
country’s presidents also became involved in strengthening diplomatic ties, which resulted in Ivan 
Gašparovič’s visit to Budapest in February 2013; this fact would have been wholly unremarkable, had it not 
been the first visit of the Slovak head of state to Hungary in nine years.7 The rhetoric has thus changed 
visibly, especially in comparison to the 2007–2010 period, when Hungarian–Slovak relations were known as 
a “cold war.” 
However, it is hard to escape the impression that, despite this personal intimacy at the highest political 
level, problems between Hungary and Slovakia remain unsolved. They are, again, concentrated on the 
question of the Hungarian diaspora, in this case living in the border areas of the southern part of Slovakia 
(around 460.000, 8.5% of the country’s population). In spite of the fact that there exists a quite well-
developed general legislation for minorities, their day to day lives are limited by two harsh laws. One 
restricts the use of Hungarian language in Slovakia, and the second bars Slovak citizens from adopting dual 
nationality; both laws were passed during the first Fico government, in 2009 and 2010 respectively.8 
Moreover, there is still an emotional historical dispute about the post-Second World War Beneš Decrees, 
which for Hungary resulted in compulsory expulsions of some of its citizens from the territory of the 
former Czechoslovakia.9 Unlike in Romania, though, the situation of minorities in Slovakia has not been 
prioritised by the government in Budapest to such an extent that it could have a negative influence on 
diplomatic relations between the two nations. 
Surprisingly, Hungary actually has more reasons to be firm towards Slovakia, rather than towards Romania, 
as the situation of the minorities in the latter is better, despite the lack of autonomy. Hungary’s more 
conciliatory attitude towards Bratislava is a significant difference here. In Slovakia, there are far fewer 
Hungarians, and they are not as well organised as those in Romania. Also, Fico’s domination on the Slovak 
political scene and the lack of a strong centre-right partner for Orbán, as well as Bratislava’s efforts to build 
an image as a trouble-free EU Member State, contribute to the current two-track policy of “small realism.” 
The voices raised about the common strategic goals, such as the Hungarian-Slovak interconnector planned 
to be built in 2015 and modernisation of the Adria oil pipeline are strident; talk about problems is quiet. 
 
                                                          
 
7 Compared to Romania, where there have not yet been any official meetings between either the prime ministers, Orbán and 
Ponta, or the presidents, Áder and Băsescu. Neither have any Hungarian–Romanian governmental sessions been held during 
Fidesz’s term in power, while in July 2013, Budapest hosted such a session between the Hungarian and Slovak governments.  
8 The 2010 Slovakian citizenship law that means any Slovak who acquires another country’s citizenship will be stripped of their 
Slovak citizenship was a response to Hungary’s law, which made it easier for ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary to acquire 
Hungarian citizenship (this was later softened somewhat by the Radičová government). In 2012, at the Fico–Orbán meeting in 
Warsaw, the Slovak prime minister promised that his government would modify this amendment. Currently it is under review by 
the Constitutional Court. As for the 2009 modification of the language law, which issued penalties for not using Slovak even in the 
territories dominated by minorities, despite similar declarations, no steps have yet been undertaken to change these paragraphs. 
9 The Beneš Decrees are touched upon by both Fidesz politicians and Hungarian ethnic leaders from Slovakia, who demand an 
apology to Hungarian Slovaks in the same way that Slovakia apologised to Carpathian Germans in 1990, and sometimes even full 
financial contribution for expulsions (Fidesz mayor of Komárom, April 2013). However, in October 2012, Fico clearly cut off 
debate on this subject, saying that the Beneš Decrees “cannot be changed.” 
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We did not establish our independent state in the 
first place for minorities, although we do respect 
them, but mainly for the Slovak state-forming 
nation. 
Robert Fico, 26 February 2013, Martin 
 
 
Hungarians in Slovakia, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Wikipedia, based on the national census in Slovakia from 2011. 
 
With Romania it is, indeed, the exact opposite, despite 
an even stronger treaty relationship.10 However, this 
does not mean that the position will not someday be 
reversed. Hungarian leaders do not hide their 
attachment to a national historical policy, which in 
their opinion aims at the consolidation of the 
Hungarian people, but which for the external observer 
may appear problematic, especially if it is carried out 
by taking actions to politically and economically unify 
Hungarians from the Carpathian Basin,11 promoting 
historically ambiguous persons (such as Horthy and 
less well-known but equally controversial right wing writers József Nyirı or Cécile Tormay) or inviting 
revisionists such as Erika Steinbach to parliament.12 When certain specific signals from Slovakia are also 
taken into consideration, it seems to be quite likely that the current amicable relationship between 
Budapest and Bratislava will not last long, especially as parliamentary elections in both countries get closer 
(in 2014 in Hungary and 2016 in Slovakia).13  
 
                                                          
 
10 Since November 2002, Hungary has been a “strategic partner” of Romania. There is however no “strategic partnership” between 
Hungary and Slovakia.    
11 A good example of economic consolidation is the “Wekerle Plan,” a project announced by the government in September 2012, 
which is defined as “a document of Hungary’s economic strategy for the whole region” (this was passed without of the opinions of 
neighbouring countries being asked). 
12 Steinbach, German conservative president of the Federation of Expellees, was in Budapest in March 2013 along with other 
German politicians, at the invitation of Kövér, who was also initiator of parliament’s commemoration of the Germans expelled 
from Hungary during the Second World War. A few days later, in a speech at the annual meeting of Expellees in Berlin, Steinbach 
praised Hungary as the model of historical policy, and also commented on the recent developments in the country, defending the 
changes made by Fidesz. 
13 In Hungary, concerns were caused by the Fico speech from February 2013. The second potential “bomb,” revealed by the Slovak 
media, was a plan for new administrative reform, which would divide the country into three big regions, ipso facto completely 
blurring the minorities’ influences. However, this remains as yet a project undiscussed by parliament. 
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The Serbian parliament strongly condemns the acts 
committed against the Hungarian civilian population 
in Vojvodina during the 1944/45 period, when 
members of the national minority in Serbia were 
being killed, denied their freedom and other rights, 
on ethnic grounds and in the absence of any court or 
administrative decisions.  
Declaration of the Serbian Parliament, 21 July 2013 
A Smart Continuation: Hungary and the Western Balkans 
The third country with a significant Hungarian minority—a crucial element contributing to Hungary’s policy 
in the region—is Serbia (around 250,000, 3.5% of the country’s population, but 13% of the Vojvodina 
province). This case, though, is incomparable to those of Romania and Slovakia for at least three reasons. 
First of all, in December 2009, Hungarians in Vojvodina were granted full cultural and political autonomy. 
Secondly, unlike in Romania and Slovakia, Budapest has no problems with supporting the biggest and the 
most popular political representation of Hungarians in Serbia.14 Thirdly, and most fundamentally, Serbia is 
not yet an EU Member State. For Hungary, all of these factors mean that its position in potential bilateral 
disputes is much stronger, and thus the country has many more cards to play than Serbia. The most 
decisive of these is of course the threat to veto a decision in favour of Serbia’s EU membership.15 
However, it is not only minority rights that has for many years been a source of tension between Hungary 
and Serbia, but their difficult Second World War history too.16 Thanks to the efforts of Belgrade and 
Budapest during the past decade, much has been done 
in order to build a constructive dialogue on 
controversial issues, but when in May 2012 the 
nationalist Tomislav Nikolić won the presidential 
elections in Serbia, concerns were raised that these 
achievements may have been in vain. In practice, 
though, Nikolić was much more pragmatic than one 
could expect from the evidence of his election 
campaign. Paradoxically, it was a vocal Nikolić who, 
along with his Hungarian counterpart János Áder, 
agreed in November 2012 to meet again in Vojvodina 
and apologise in the name of their nations for 
atrocities committed during the Second World War, 
precedent step unprecedented in modern Hungarian–
Serbian relations. Despite some doubts, the Áder–
Nikolić historical reconciliation took place in the late June, first in Belgrade and then in the Vojvodinian 
village of Čurug. At the same time, the Serbian parliament passed a special resolution condemning acts 
against the Hungarian civilian population in the mid-1940s, while Áder has apologised for the crimes 
committed by Hungarians against Serbs.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
14 In Slovakia and Romania, there are two Hungarian parties: Most–Híd and the Democratic Union of Hungarians (UDMR), but 
neither of them has support from Fidesz, which finds them to be an element of the local mainstream rather than a true 
representative of ethnic interests. Hence, the Orbán government has aimed to increase the political weight of smaller movements, 
which are both more loyal to Budapest and stronger opponents of the policies of their home countries. This strategy, though, 
failed, as the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (MKP) from Slovakia, nor the Orbán-backed Romanian Hungarian People’s Party in 
Transylvania, and the Kövér-backed Hungarian People’s Party (MPP) all failed to reach the threshold in the 2012 parliamentary 
elections in Slovakia and Romania. 
15 This was the case of the restitution law, which was passed by the Serbian parliament in September 2011. The law sought to 
return  properties, nationalised by the Communists in the years 1945–1968, to previous owners. However, the original regulations 
excluded Hungarian citizens, who during the Second World War served in the forces of occupied Serbia. Budapest requested that 
the law be amended, and threatened to withdraw its support for Belgrade’s plans to integrate with the EU. Serbia modified the 
contested paragraphs.   
16 D. Kałan, “Polityka Węgier wobec Bałkanów Zachodnich,” Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny, nr 4, 2011, pp. 55–68. 
8 
 
 
Hungarians in Vojvodina, 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the map the areas where Hungarians represent more than 50% of the population are shown in pink, and between 10–50% in orange. 
Source: Hungarian Human Right Foundation, www.hhrf.org. 
 
It seems therefore that Serbia has begun to consider its northern neighbour as too important to ignore, 
now realising that Hungary may be in a position to help the country join the EU, just as it did with Croatia. 
The Orbán government was clear from the very beginning of its tenure that it wanted to continue the 
efforts of previous cabinets to make enhanced ties with Croatia a strategic goal of the country’s foreign 
policy. Hence, during Hungary’s Presidency of the Council of the EU (January–June 2011), Budapest 
successfully closed accession negotiations with Zagreb, and then the Hungarian parliament ratified the 
treaty, becoming the second in the EU to do so. In comparing Croatia to Serbia, it should be noticed that 
there are significant differences that facilitate the Hungarian–Croatian talks. These include the lack of 
serious historical resentments, Croatia’s very small Hungarian minority, better people-to-people and 
economic contacts, and longer and more successful traditions of cooperation. Equally important are the 
advanced energy dialogue, manifested in the form of a common gas interconnector (opened in August 
2011), and the Hungarian company MOL’s expansion in Croatia. 
It is no coincidence that Hungarian leaders, while drawing their visions of a strong CE, always mention the 
Adriatic Sea too. Realistically speaking, the Western Balkans is the only direction for external activity where 
Budapest may truly have really something to say in the EU forum. The Orbán government is here 
pragmatic; paradoxically, the cabinet which prefers to describe its policy as a break with the legacy of its 
predecessors, has in the Western Balkans chosen a non-revolutionary smart continuation and has so far got 
it right. This is true not only in terms of the policy of “historical reconciliation” with Serbia or of 
maintaining strategic dialogue with Croatia, but also regarding enhancing political and economic ties with 
other countries from the region, Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia.  
Conclusions 
1. Orbán is, apart from József Antall (the first democratically-elected prime minister of Hungary after the 
fall of Communism) the only head of the Hungarian government since 1989 who has rhetorically attached 
so much importance to CE and its future development. Although appreciating the vigour and ambition of 
his vision, two things must be said. Firstly, apart from geopolitical reasoning, there is a more pragmatic 
reason behind Orbán’s special attachment to the region, and this is the fact that, in the long-running dispute 
between Hungary and the EU, Central European governments either defended Budapest or took neutral 
positions. Secondly, the success of the project of a “beautiful future for CE” is rather dependent on each 
country’s economic performance and general conjuncture, rather than politicians’ prophecies, not to 
mention the fact that the latter may be seen as contradictory to Hungary’s actual policy, which is not 
9 
 
always directed towards reinforcing unity and building regional compromise. Budapest thus raises  
a question about its real motivation, namely, if whether Orbán’s vision is not in reality aimed at increasing 
Hungarian influence in those neighbouring countries in which the Hungarian minorities are substantial. 
2. Fidesz has, since at least the mid-1990s, paid special attention to the treatment of Hungarians living 
abroad, consequently demanding “reunification of Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin across the borders.”17 
This approach towards the Hungarian communities has already become not only part of identity of this 
party, but also an important element of its current political agenda, contributing to the so-called “national 
policy.” In the period 2010–2013, important steps have been undertaken, such as simplification of the 
procedure of receiving Hungarian citizenship, voting rights for minorities, or the addition of a paragraph to 
the new constitution in 2011, on “supporting their efforts to preserve their Hungarian identity.” Having said 
that, one needs to admit that the results of this policy cannot be fully satisfying, as it has turned out to be 
simply insufficient in improving the position of minorities in local circumstances (Slovakia) and has even 
caused a serious diplomatic clash (Romania). What also has to be highlighted is that the last three years 
have proved how the question of minorities is used to achieve temporary goals in domestic politics by both 
Hungary and its neighbouring countries, which need to maintain a certain level of mistrust of one another in 
order to manage strong resentments and popular negative moods.  
3. With regards to the Hungarian–Romanian relationship, Budapest made three tactical mistakes, 
resulting—together with Bucharest’s intransigent position—in the current turbulent dialogue with the 
Ponta government. 
• The first mistake was that, believing in the stability of the conservative coalition and the 
incontestable position of a centre-right president Băsescu, Hungary decided to build contacts with 
its eastern neighbour almost purely on “personal diplomacy” between the leaders, ignoring and 
sometimes even openly criticising the left-wing opposition. This quite naturally raised concerns 
about Hungary interfering in the domestic policy of Romania, and negatively influenced relations 
between the two countries when the left came to power. 
• Budapest also tended to ignore the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, the minorities’ 
strongest political representation, which between 1996–2008 and 2009–2012 was a member or 
supporter of every Romanian coalition. Instead, Fidesz leaders became engaged in assisting smaller 
groups organised around more radical activist movements, which failed to receive any significant 
attention from Romania’s Hungarian society. 
• Thirdly, in the government’s strategy towards the Hungarian minority, the commitment to the 
Székelys demands (including territorial autonomy) is clearly noticeable. However, Székelys are only 
half of the whole Hungarian community in Romania, and thus subordinating the country’s policy to 
their expectations seems to be questionable not only from the point of view of the diplomatic 
dialogue with Bucharest, but also because this could be seen by other Romanian Hungarians as 
divisive. 
4. The current relations with Slovakia may serve as an example of a much more cool-headed policy. While 
appreciating the efforts of Hungarian leaders in successfully rebuilding the atmosphere between the two 
neighbours after the turbulent period of 2007–2010, two conclusions should be emphasised.  
• Comparing Slovakia with Romania, it may be noticed that Budapest simply has fewer instruments 
available for increasing its impact on its northern neighbour. The minority in Slovakia is smaller and 
less well-organised, the country’s political stability formed around the left-wing leader Fico is 
greater, the centre-right Băsescu-like potential partners for Orbán are too weak, and local parties 
supported by Fidesz are equally marginalised. Apart from that, having an already harsh dialogue with 
Romania, Budapest wanted to avoid “a two-front war.” These are thus the main reasons why 
Hungary evaluated its position quite realistically and chose a strategy of not increasing tensions.  
                                                          
 
17 E. Oltay, Fidesz and the Reinvention of the Hungarian Center-Right, Századvég Kiadó, Budapest, 2013, pp. 134–137.   
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• The latter, indeed, brought certain benefits for Hungary (such as improving its international image), 
but in general, maintaining the status quo seems to be more advantageous for Bratislava than for 
Budapest. The situation for Orbán’s government is, indeed, very troublesome. On the one hand,  
it is quite unlikely that, bearing in mind the Slovak leader’s recent declarations, the current soft 
policy will improve the position of Hungarians in Slovakia; on the other hand, sharpening the 
strategy will not only result in regress of the prospects of the minority still further but also will 
open “the second front” and disorganise Slovak–Hungarian cooperation in the EU and the Visegrad 
Group. 
5. The paradox of Hungary’s relations with Serbia is that there are still ethnic clashes on the social level, 
while the political elites have engaged successfully in discussing topics both from the difficult past and on the 
future of pragmatic cooperation (this is exactly to the opposite of the situation with Romania). Contacts 
with the second biggest country in that region, Croatia, should in turn be seen as a model for good and 
generally trouble-free dialogue between the two neighbours. The Orbán government, which has in many 
spheres declared a radical break with the policy of its predecessors, has quite seamlessly continued the 
efforts of previous cabinets to bring the Western Balkans closer to Hungary. The main reasons for this are 
that there is less importance attached to the most inflammatory question of Hungarian minorities in this 
area, Hungary’s will to improve both unexploited economic opportunities and its position in the EU, and 
above all the awareness of Hungary’s political predominance in the dialogue with these countries which are 
not EU Member States.  
 
Annex 1: The Value of Trade between Hungary and CE countries, € 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
ALB 33.5 mln 55.7 mln 49.9 mln 56.6 mln 51.1 mln 47.0 mln 
BOS 343.8 mln 435.8 mln 273.7 mln 316.4 mln 323.3 mln 344.9 mln 
CRO 1,129 mln 1,195 mln 969.0 mln 1,018 mln 1,348 mln 1,539 mln 
CZE 4,232 mln 4,782 mln 3,546 mln 4,231 mln 5,095 mln 5,430 mln 
KOS - - 22.0 mln 24.9 mln 29.8 mln 30.3 mln 
MAC 97.4 mln 115.1 mln 101.3 mln 100.3 mln 103.8 mln 123.4 mln 
MON 89.0 mln 43.9 mln 38.3 mln 55.5 mln 77.2 mln 90.7 mln 
POL 4,703 mln 4,865 mln 4,153 mln 5,606 mln 5,998 mln 6,275 mln 
SLO 4,181 mln 5,098 mln 4,918 mln 6,021 mln 8,049 mln 8,454 mln 
ROM 3,821 mln 4,590 mln 4,107 mln 5,106 mln 6,704 mln 6,639  mln 
SER 880.1 mln 1,073 mln 843.6 mln 1,031 mln 1,340 mln 1,535 mln 
GER 31,894 mln 32,046 mln 26,922 mln 30,977 mln 34,572 mln 36,757 mln 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Hungarian Statistical Office (KSH). 
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Annex 2: Hungarian Population in Neighbouring Countries 
 circa 1991 circa 2001 circa 2011 %, 2011 
AUS* 6,763 6,641 no data yet ≈0.1 
CRO 22,355 16,595 14,048 0.3 
ROM 1,624,959 1,447,544 1,237,746 6.5 
SER 345,376 293,299 251,136 3.5 
SVK 567,296 520,528 458,467 8.5 
SVN 8,000 6,243 no data yet ≈0.3 
UKR 163,111 156,600 no data yet ≈0.3 
*only from the Burgenland area  
Source: The Countries’ Population Censuses (Statistical Offices). 
 
Annex 3: Leading national “hawks” and “doves” around Orbán 
  HAWKS     DOVES   
  
László Kövér 
Speaker of the 
National Assembly,        
co-founder of Fidesz 
 
János Martonyi 
Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs 
  
Zsolt Németh 
State Secretary of 
the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 
co-founder of Fidesz 
 
János Áder 
President  
of Hungary, 
co-founder  
of Fidesz 
  
Zsolt Semjén 
Deputy Prime 
Minister 
 
 Most diplomats 
 
